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Abstract
The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence
in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and
the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of
interaction of large number of indistinguishable small players against a major player,
with focus on the study of security and crime prevention. In this paper we introduce
such a general framework for complex interaction in network structures of many
players, that incorporates individual decision making inside the environment (the
mean-field game component), binary interaction (the evolutionary game component),
and the interference of a principal player (the pressure-resistance game component).
To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model, we suggest
working, in sequence, in three basic asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal
decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time.
Keywords: mean-field game, evolutionary game, pressure-resistance game, counter-
terrorism, bot-net defense, cyber-security, inspection, corruption, crime prevention.
1 Introduction
The issue of social security and crime prevention dominantly concerns the modern so-
cieties. In the traditional terrain of counter-terrorism, corruption and tax evasion, the
corresponding authorities in charge struggle to deal with large populations of increasingly
informed violating individuals (this term will be used interchangeably with the terms
agents or small players). Reversely, in the recently emerging field of cyber-security, large
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groups of individuals aim to defend their private computers against a lurking cyber-
criminal (bot-net defence). Similar reasoning can be asserted for the citizens of a large
city defending against a biological weapon (bio-terrorism). The rapid advance in means
of interaction, communication and exchange of information has established the individ-
uals’ social network as a decisive parameter of their strategies in the above and similar
instances. Here we consider agents who are organized in specific social or phenotypic (or
even geographical), and behavioural network structures. The central focus of this paper is
to investigate the evolution of the complex process where a (very) large number of inter-
acting individuals, susceptible to engage in or be affected by criminal behaviour, decide
their strategies subject to a benevolent, or respectively to a malicious, major player’s (this
term will be used interchangeably with the term principal) pressure, to their individual
optimization criterion, and to their (social) environment’s influence.
In the real life scenaria we aim to capture with our approach, it is natural to distinguish
two main dimensions of structure. The first dimension refers to the individuals’ objective
distribution among different levels of social, bureaucratic, or phenotypic hierarchy, or
to their geographical distribution, in general to any finite partition according to their
independent characteristics. One can think for example of tax payers of different bands,
employees of different grades, or infected computers/individuals of different degrees. The
second dimension refers to the agents’ distribution among different types of strategy or
behaviour, subject (mainly) to the agents’ individual control; say for example the level of
tax evasion in the field of inspection games, the extent of bribery acceptance in the field
of corruption games, or the level of defence against terrorist activity or a malware in the
fields of counter terrorism and cyber-security respectively.
Note that our game theoretic approach is developed under the basic idea of a very large
number of non-cooperative, interacting agents playing against (i.e. under the pressure of)
a single major player. In principle, our model belongs to the wide class of non-linear
Markov games, see e.g., Kolokoltsov (2010), combining under an extended scheme the
pressure-resistance, the evolutionary, and the mean-field game approach.
The pressure-resistance terminology was introduced in Kolokoltsov (2014), where ideas
captured from evolutionary game theory were extended, including the pressure of a prin-
cipal player on a large group of interacting agents. Here, the pressure-resistance game
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component refers to the principal’s interference generatin transitions solely on the first
dimension of structure (e.g. a benevolent director being able to promote or downgrade
interacting bureaucrats, computers and individuals getting infected or recovering subject
to a cyber-criminal’s and a bio-terrorist’s activity respectively). This approach of major
and minor players has also been considered for the analysis of mean-field type models,
see, e.g., Huang (2010); Bensoussan, Chau and Yam (2016); Carmona and Zhu (2016).
The evolutionary game component refers to the agents’ pairwise interactions, with a
particular focus on the established social norms effect, potentially generating transitions
on both dimensions of structure. For a general survey on the literature of population dy-
namics applications on game theory, that is, on evolutionary game theory, see, e.g., Smith
(1988); Weibull (1997); Gintis (2000); Samuelson (2002); Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003);
Taylor et al. (2004); Szabo´ and Fath (2007), and references therein. See also Friedman
(1998, 1991) for specific application in economics.
The mean-field game component refers to the agents’ individual optimization con-
trolled by their strategic position on the second dimension of structure, taking into ac-
count the entire population’s behaviour. This element of ‘globally’ rational optimization
introduces an additional level of complexity compared to Katsikas, Kolokoltsov and Yang
(2016); Kolokoltsov (2014), where optimization strictly upon imitation of successful strate-
gies on the basis of binary comparison of payoffs was considered (purely evolutionary
approach). Mean-field games (MFG) were introduced by Larsy and Lions (2007), by
analogy with the mean-field theory in statistical mechanics, and were also developed inde-
pendently by Huang, Malhame´ and Caines (2006) as large population stochastic dynamic
games. In principle, they represent a natural extension of earlier work in the economics
literature under the assumption of infinite number of players, see, e.g., Aumann (1964);
Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik (1980) for static games, Jovanovic and Rosenthal (1988);
Bergin and Bernhardt (1992) for dynamic games. The literature on mean-field games is
growing really fast, see, e.g., Tembine et al. (2009); Cardaliaguet (2010); Caines (2013);
Bensoussan, Frehse and Yam (2013); Carmona and Delarue (2013); Gomes and Saude (2014);
Bauso, Tembine and Basar (2016), and references therein for a general survey.
Here we shall work in three asymptotic regimes; fast execution of the agents’ personal
decisions, weak binary interactions, and small discounting in time. The need to intro-
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duce this ternary asymptotic approach is revealed from the analysis of a similar setting
conducted by Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan (2016), where the distribution of infection in
a computers network with a malicious software controlled by a cyber-criminal was de-
scribed by a stationary MFG model with four states. Whilst the three states model
describing the distribution of corruption in a population of bureaucrats under the pres-
sure of a benevolent principal that was studied by Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2015), is
solved explicitly without any asymptotic simplifications, the introduction of a fourth state
in Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan (2016) already increases the complexity significantly, such
that the need to consider (though not as strongly as we do here) the assumption of large
λ (fast decisions execution) is critical to obtain descent solutions.
Similarly, for the more complicated n×m states model we introduce here, the need
to consider the three asymptotic regimes mentioned above becomes obvious. In principle,
even without working in these regimes one can sometimes obtain explicit but extremely
lengthy formulas, not revealing any clearer insights. But also form a practical point of view
our asymptotic approach has clear interpretation. Indicatively, an infinitely large transi-
tion rate λ implies the natural process of immediate execution of personal decisions as long
as they have already been taken, while a vanishingly small discounting coefficient δdis im-
plies a short planning horizon. Both of the models studied in Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan
(2016); Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2015), as well as the extended approach presented in
this paper, belong to the category of finite state space mean-field games that were initially
considered by Gomes, Mohr and Souza (2010, 2013). See also Gomes, Velho and Wolfram
(2014) specifically for socio-economic applications.
In addition to the above applications on corruption, and cyber-security, here we in-
troduce the bio-terrorism interpretation, that is, the defence of a population against a
biological weapon. The implementation of game theoretic methods to the analysis of
terrorism has been vastly developed ever since the 1980s, with game theory allowing the
investigation of different strategic interactions (e.g. terrorists vs government, terrorists
vs terrorists, terrorists for sponsors, terrorists for supporters), see, e.g., Sandler (2005);
Sandler and Arce (2007); Sandler and Siqueira (2009) and references therein. The addi-
tional pairing captured here is civilians vs a bio-terrorist.
We organize the paper as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model, specifying
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explicitly the time-dependent and stationary MFG consistency problems. In Section 3
we solve the stationary problem in our proposed asymptotic regimes, and we show that
the identified solution is a stable fixed point of the corresponding evolutionary dynam-
ics. In Section 4 we obtain our main result; we construct the class of time-dependent
solutions that stay in a neighbourhood of the identified stationary solution. In the termi-
nology of mathematical economics, this stationary solution represents a turnpike (see, e.g.,
Kolokoltsov and Yang (2012); Zaslavski (2006)) for the class of time-dependent solutions.
In Section 5 we summarize our approach and our results.
2 Formal Model
Let H = {1, . . . , |H| = n} be a finite set characterizing the hierarchical partition of small
players inside the environment, say their position in the bureaucratic staircase of an
organization. Alternatively, it may describe the extend of individuals’ infection to a bio-
weapon. Moreover, let B = {1, . . . , |B| = m} be a finite set characterizing the behavioural
or strategic partition of agents, say the level of compliance with official regulations, the
extend of involvement in terrorist activity, or the degree of protection for PCs/citizens
against cyber-criminals/bio-terrorists. Then, the states of an agent are given by ordered
pairs of the form (h, b), with h ∈ H, b ∈ B, the finite state space being S = H ×B.
Remark. In some cases it is reasonable to include an additional zero state, some kind
of a rank-less sink, where no choice of B is available, say for example a corrupted civil
servant suspended from duty without the potential to be bribed, an infected individual put
in quarantine, and so forth. Thus, the state space can be either S = H ×B as initially
defined above, or S˜ = H ×B ∪ {0} = S ∪ {0} as alternatively implied with this comment.
We shall stick here to the first instance.
We distinguish the following three structures.
Firstly, the decision structure (B,ED,λ), that is a non-oriented graph with the set of
vertices B and the set of edges ED, where an edge e joins the vertices i and j whenever
an agent is able to switch between states (h, i) and (h, j). Every such transition in B
requires certain random λ-exponential time. For simplicity, a single parameter λ is chosen
for all possible transitions. As mentioned, we shall mostly look at the asymptotic regime
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with λ→∞. We take the agents to be homogeneous and indistinguishable, in the sense
that their strategies and payoffs may depend only on their states, and not on any other
individual characteristics. Hence, a decision of an agent in a state (h, b) at any time is
given by the decision matrix u = (uhb→hb˜), expressing his intention to switch from strategy
b to b˜, for all b˜ ∈ B such that b˜ 6= b. In our model, we consider agents without mixed
strategies, that is, for any state (h, b) the decision vector (uhb→hb˜) is either identically
zero, when the agent does not wish to change strategy, or there exists one strategy b1 6= b
such that uhb→hb1 = 1, and all the other coordinates of (uhb→hb˜) being zero, when the
agent wishes to change from strategy b to b1.
Secondly, the pressure structure (H,EP , qjb→ib), that is an oriented graph, where an
edge e joins the vertices j and i whenever a major player has the power to upgrade or
downgrade the small players from the hierarchy level j to i. In this case, coefficients qjb→ib
represent the rates of such transitions in H, that is, every such transition requires certain
qjb→ib-exponential waiting time. In general, these rates may depend on some principal’s
control (one can think of some parameter describing his/her efforts, for example his/her
budget). We shall not exploit this version here.
Finally, we consider the evolution structure that characterizes the change in the distri-
bution of states due to the agents’ pairwise interaction (e.g. through exchange of opinions,
fight with competitors, effect of established social norms etc.). This can be described by
the set of rates qss1→s2/N , by which an agent in state s can stimulate the transition of
another agent from state s1 to state s2. For instance, an honest agent (or even a cor-
rupted one) may help the principal to discover, and therefore punish, the illegal behaviour
of a corrupted agent. Note that transitions due to binary interaction can be naturally
separated into transitions in B and transitions in H, yielding respectively the behavioural
and the hierarchical evolution structures.
Remark. The scaling 1/N for the rates of binary interactions is the standard procedure of
making the strength of N2 (number of pairs) binary transitions comparable to the strength
of N unilateral transitions.
Here we shall ignore the behavioural element of the evolution structure. That is, we
shall assume that transition rates qss1→s2/N may not vanish only for two states s1, s2
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that differ strictly in their h-component. Moreover, since we shall work in the asymptotic
regime of small binary interactions, it would be helpful to introduce directly a small pa-
rameter δint discounting the power of these interactions. Then, we shall denote thereafter
the corresponding transition rates by δint · q
s
h1b→h2b
/N .
Remark. The evolutionary transitions in B represent an alternative to the individual
transitions described by the decision structure (B,ED,λ), and can be considered negligible
in the limit λ→∞ that we shall look at here. Taking into account a behavioural evolution
structure is more appropriate in the absence of a decision structure, which was the case
developed by Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev (2015).
To introduce a more detailed description of our game theoretic framework, note that
the states of the corresponding N players game are the N -tuples of the form,
{(h1, b1), . . . , (hN , bN )},
where each pair (hi, bi) describes each of the N players position on the hierarchy and the
behaviour axis respectively. Assuming that each player adopts a decision matrix u, then
the system evolves according to the continuous time Markov chain introduced above, with
the corresponding transitions rates as were specified. If we further specify the rewards
for staying in each state per unit of time, the transition fees (or costs) for transiting form
one state to another, as well as the terminal payoffs corresponding to each state for some
finite terminal time, then we shall be working in the setting of a stochastic dynamic game
of finite number of players.
As usual in a mean-field game approach, we are interested in estimating the approx-
imate symmetric Nash equilibria. Assuming indistinguishable agents, the system’s state
space can be reduced to the set Znm+ of vectors n = (nij), i ∈ H, j ∈ B, where nij denotes
the number of agents in state (i, j), and N =
∑
ij nij denotes the (constant) total number
of agents.
Therefore, the initially introduced Markov chain reduces to the Markov chain on Znm+ ,
described by the time-dependent generator:
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LtNF (n) =
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
naβ · qaβ→cβ ·
(
F (ncβaβ)−F (n)
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
n∑
γ
m∑
k
naβ · δint · q
γk
aβ→cβ/N · nγk ·
(
F (ncβaβ)−F (n)
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
m∑
c
naβ · λ · uaβ→ac ·
(
F (nacaβ)−F (n)
)
,
(1)
where the unchanged values in the arguments of function F on the right-hand side are
omitted. Equivalently, in the normalized version the system’s state space can be reduced
to the subset of the probability simplex ΣNn×m ⊆ R
n×m, with vectors of the form x =
(xij) = n/N , i ∈ H, j ∈ B, where each coordinate represents the occupation density
(alternatively the occupation probability) of each state (i, j).
For the Markov chain on ΣNn×m, generator (1) can be rewritten in the equivalent form:
LtNf (x) =
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
xaβ ·N · qaβ→cβ ·
(
f (x+ (ecβ − eaβ)/N)− f (x)
)
+
n∑
a,c,γ
m∑
β,k
xaβ ·N · δint · q
γk
aβ→cβ/N · xγk ·N ·
(
f (x+ (ecβ − eaβ)/N)− f (x)
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
m∑
c
xaβ ·N · λ · uaβ→ac ·
(
f (x+ (eac − eaβ)/N)− f (x)
)
,
(2)
where {eij} is the standard orthonormal basis in R
n×m. Assuming, additionally, that f
is a continuously differentiable function on ΣNn×m, and taking its Taylor expansion, in the
limit of infinitely many small players N →∞, we find that the above generator eventually
converges to:
Ltf (x) =
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
xaβ · qaβ→cβ ·
( ∂f
∂xcβ
−
∂f
∂xaβ
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
n∑
γ
m∑
k
xaβ · δint · q
γk
aβ→cβ · xγk ·
( ∂f
∂xcβ
−
∂f
∂xaβ
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
m∑
c
xaβ · λ · uaβ→ac ·
( ∂f
∂xac
−
∂f
∂xaβ
)
,
(3)
8
or equivalently to the form:
Ltf (x) =
n∑
a6=c
m∑
β
n∑
c
(xaβ · qaβ→cβ − xcβ · qcβ→aβ) ·
∂f
∂xcβ
+
n∑
a6=c
m∑
β
n∑
c
n∑
γ
m∑
s
(xaβ · δint · q
γs
aβ→cβ · xγs − xcβ · δint · q
γs
cβ→aβ · xγs) ·
∂f
∂xcβ
+
m∑
β
n∑
c
m∑
s 6=β
(xcs · λ · ucs→cβ − xcβ · λ · ucβ→cs) ·
∂f
∂xcβ
.
(4)
This is a first order partial differential operator, that generates a deterministic Markov
process, whose dynamics are governed by the characteristic equations of Lt:
x˙ij =
m∑
k 6=j
(xik · λ · uik→ij − xij · λ · uij→ik) +
n∑
a6=i
(xaj · qaj→ij − xij · qij→aj)
+
m∑
k
n∑
a6=i
n∑
γ
(xaj · δint · q
γk
sj→ij · xγk − xij · δint · q
γk
ij→aj · xγk).
(5)
These calculations make the following result plausible:
Proposition 1. Given the Markovian interaction we introduced above consisting of the
decision, the pressure-resistance and the evolution structures, if the elements of the matrix-
valued function x = (xij) denote the occupation probabilities of states (i, j), and (ui,k→j)
is the decision matrix that may depend on time, the evolution of x is given by system (5).
Remark. For a rigorous explanation (not just the formal description that we provide
here) of the Markov chain’s convergence to the deterministic process given by (5), see,
e.g., Kolokoltsov (2012).
The above general structure is rather complicated. To deal effectively with this com-
plexity, one can distinguish two natural simplifying frameworks: (i) the set of edges is
ordered and only the transitions between neighbours are allowed, (ii) the corresponding
graph is complete, so that all transitions are allowed and have comparable rates. We
shall choose the second alternative for B, and the first alternative for H thinking of it
as an hierarchy of agents. Moreover, we shall assume that the binary interaction occurs
only within a common level in H, ignoring the binary interaction between the agents in
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different levels of the hierarchy structure. Therefore, for the transition rates qij→i+1,j of
the pressure structure increasing in i ∈ H, we introduce the shorter notation q+ij , and for
the transition rates qij→i−1,j decreasing in i ∈ H, we introduce the notation q
−
ij . Accord-
ingly, for the transition rates qikij→i+1,j of the hierarchical evolution structure increasing
in i ∈ H, we introduce the shorter notation q+kij , and for the transition rates q
ik
i→i−1,j
decreasing in i ∈ H, we shall use the notation q−kij .
•••••
•••••
•••••
•••••
•••••
usj→sl(λ)
q+kil
q−kil
q+ij
q−ij
H
s
i
j k l B
Figure 1: The simplified version of our network: only the transitions between neighbours
are allowed in H, all transitions are allowed in B, binary interaction occurs only within
a common level in H.
Applying the above simplifications, the kinetic equations (5) reduce to the following
system:
x˙ij = λ ·
∑
k 6=j
(uik→ijxik − uij→ikxij) + q
−
i+1,j · xi+1,j + q
+
i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q
+
ij + q
−
ij) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
(q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j + q
−k
i+1,j · xi+1,k · xi+1,j − (q
+k
ij + q
−k
ij ) · xik · xij).
(6)
Note that equations (6) hold only for the internal states (i, j), i ∈ H, j ∈ B, such
that i 6= 1, |H|. On the contrary, for the boundary states (i, j) the terms involving
downgrading to i− 1 and upgrading to i+ 1 respectively are omitted. In particular, we
consider:
q+knj = q
−k
1j = 0 , q
+
nj = q
−
1j = 0. (7)
10
Additionally, to simplify further the final explicit calculations, for all i ∈ H, j ∈ B,
we shall consider the constraint:
q+ij = q
−
i+1,j, (8)
which can be interpreted as a detailed balance condition; it actually asserts that the
number of downgrades is compensated in average by the number of upgrades.
Remark. An alternative simple (and analogously manageable) model allows the principal
either to move an agent one-step upward in the hierarchy with rates q+ij and q
+k
ij respec-
tively, or send an agent directly down to the lowest state with rates qdij and q
dk
ij respectively.
In this case the system describing the evolution of occupation densities becomes, for i 6= 1:
x˙ij = λ ·
∑
k 6=j
(ui,k→j · xik − ui,j→k · xij) + q
+
i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q
+
ij + q
d
ij) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
(q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j − q
+k
ij · xik · xij)− δint ·
∑
k∈B
qdkij · xik · xij ,
(9)
with an obvious modification for i = 1.
To identify the agents’ optimal decision vector, we need first to define certain game
characteristics such as the state rewards and the transition costs. In particular, we assign
the reward wij per unit of time to an agent for staying in state (i, j), the fee/cost fBkj for an
agent’s elective transition from state (h, k) to state (h, j) (which we assume independent
of h for brevity), and the fine/cost fHj for an agent’s enforced transition from state (j, b)
to state (j − 1, b) (which we assume independent of b for brevity). Let, additionally,
gij = gij(t) be the payoff corresponding to the state (i, j) in the process starting at time t
and terminating at time T . Then, for an infinitesimally small time step τ , and assuming
that g(t) is differentiable in time, an agent at state (i, j) decides his/her strategy targeting
to optimize the expression:
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gij(t) = max
u
{
τ ·wij + τ ·
(
λ · uij→ik · (gik(t+ τ )− f
B
jk) + q
−
ij · (gi−1,j(t+ τ )− f
H
i )
+q+ij · gi+1,j(t+ τ ) +
m∑
k
xik · δint · (q
+k
ij gi+1,j(t+ τ ) + q
−k
ij (gi−1,j(t+ τ )− f
H
i ))
)
+
(
1− τ · (λ · uij→ik + q
+
ij + q
−
ij +
m∑
k
xik · δint · (q
+k
ij + q
−k
ij ))
)
· gij(t+ τ )
}
.
(10)
Remark. Depending on the application we choose to investigate in each instance, the
agents’ optimum can be either to maximize his/her payoff/fitness, or to minimize his/her
cost. Here we stick to the first case, thinking of bribed bureaucrats or defending civilians.
Taking the Taylor expansion specifically of the term gij(t+ τ ), and omitting terms of
order O(τ2), the above optimization equation turns into the form:
wij +
∂gij(t)
∂t
+max
u
{
λ · uij→ik · (gik(t+ τ )− f
B
jk − gij(t))
}
+
m∑
k
xik · δint ·
(
q+kij · (gi+1,j(t+ τ )− gij(t)) + q
−k
ij · (gi−1,j(t+ τ )− f
H
i − gij(t))
)
+q+ij · (gi+1,j(t+ τ )− gij(t)) + q
−
ij · (gi−1,j(t+ τ )− f
H
i − gij(t)) = 0.
(11)
In the limit of infinitesimally small time step τ → 0, equation (11) implies the evolu-
tionary Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman (HJB) equation, that is satisfied by the individual opti-
mal payoffs gij . A rigorous derivation of the HJB equation can be found in every standard
textbook on dynamic programming and optimal control, see, e.g., Kamien and Schwartz
(1991). In particular for stochastic dynamic programming, see, e.g., Ross (2014).
The above yields the following result:
Proposition 2. Given the Markovian interaction we introduced above consisting of the
decision, the pressure-resistance and the evolution structure, if gij = gij(t) denotes the
payoff to an agent at state (ij) in the process starting at time t and terminating at time
T , and subject to a given evolution of the occupation density vector x given by (6), these
individual optimal payoffs gij(t) will satisfy the following evolutionary HJB equation:
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g˙ij + λ ·max
u
{uij→ik · (gik − gij − f
B
jk)}+ q
+
ij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q
−
ij · (gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
+δint ·
(∑
k∈B
q+kij · xik · (gi+1,j − gij) +
∑
k∈B
q−kij · xik · (gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
)
+wij = 0.
(12)
As above, note that equations (12) hold only for the internal states (i, j), i ∈ H,
j ∈ B, such that i 6= 1, |H|. For the boundary states (i, j) the terms involving transitions
to i− 1 or from i+ 1 respectively are omitted. Indicatively, for i = 1 it is:
g˙1j = w1j + λmax
u
{u1,j→k(gik − g1j − f
B
jk)}+ q
+
1j(g2,j − g1,j) + δint
∑
k∈B
q+k1j xik(g2j − g1j).
We consider here the optimization problem of estimating the discounted optimal payoff
(alternatively one can look for the average payoff in a long time horizon). Hence, assuming
the discounting coefficient δdis for future payoffs, the evolutionary HJB equation for the
discounted optimal payoff e−δdis·t · gij(t) of an agent at state (i, j), with any finite planning
horizon T , can be written as:
g˙ij + λ ·max
u
{uij→ik · (gik − gij − f
B
jk)}+ q
+
ij (gi+1,j − gij) + q
−
ij(gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
+
∑
k∈B
δint · xik ·
(
q+kij (gi+1,j − gij) + q
−k
ij (gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
)
+wij = δdis · gij(t).
(13)
The basic mean-field game consistency problem states that, for some interval [0,T ],
every agent will benefit from applying the same common control, that is, from adopting
the same decision vector. In other words, the MFG consistency condition states that one
needs to consider the kinetic equations (6) (i.e. the forward system), where the collective
control is taken into account, and the evolutionary HJB equations (13) (i.e. the backward
system), where individual controls are used, as a coupled forward-backward system of
equations on a given time horizon [0,T ], complemented by some initial condition x0 for
the occupation density vector x, and some terminal condition gT for the optimal payoff
g, such that x, g and the common u solve the aforesaid system. Our aim here is first to
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identify the solution of the stationary consistency problem, and then to investigate the
general time-dependent problem, extending (if possible) our findings for the stationary
problem. As mentioned, we shall work in three asymptotic regimes; fast execution of the
agents’ personal decisions, weak binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time.
3 Stationary Problem
The stationary MFG consistency problem consists of the stationary HJB equation for the
discounted optimal payoff e−δdis·t · gij of an agent at state (i, j), with a finite time horizon:
wij + λ ·max
u
ui,j→k · (gik − gij − f
B
jk) + q
+
ij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q
−
ij · (gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
xik ·
(
q+kij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q
−k
ij · (gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
)
= δdis · gij ,
(14)
where the evolution given by (6) is replaced with the corresponding fixed point condition:
λ ·
∑
k 6=j
(ui,k→j · xik − ui,j→k · xij) + q
−
i+1,j · xi+1,j + q
+
i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q
+
i,j + q
−
i,j) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j + q
−k
i+1,j · xi+1,k · xi+1,j − (q
+k
ij + q
−k
ij ) · xik · xij = 0.
(15)
By analogy with the time-dependent problem, for the stationary MFG consistency
problem one needs to consider (14),(15) as a coupled stationary system. In the asymptotic
limit of fast execution of individual decisions, λ → ∞, the terms in (14),(15) containing
the transition rates λ should obviously vanish (otherwise they would ‘explode’ to infinity).
For a practical interpretation of this observation, one can think that if the execution of
personal decisions is significantly fast, then in a stationary state no agent should be
interested in switching strategy. In this case (14),(15) turn respectively into the form:
wij + q
+
ij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q
−
ij · (gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
xik ·
(
q+kij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q
−k
ij · (gi−1,j − gij − f
H
i )
)
= δdis · gij ,
(16)
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and,
q−i+1,j · xi+1,j + q
+
i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q
+
i,j + q
−
i,j) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j + q
−k
i+1,j · xi+1,k · xi+1,j − (q
+k
ij + q
−k
ij ) · xik · xij = 0,
(17)
supplemented by the consistency condition:
gik − gij − f
B
jk ≤ 0, (18)
for all i ∈ H, j, k ∈ B, such that xij 6= 0. In fact, the consistency condition (18) ensures
that all terms in (14) and (15) including elements of the decision matrix indeed vanish in
(16) and (17) respectively, for all the occupied states.
Introducing further the auxiliary notation w˜ij = wij − q
−
ij · f
H
i , (16) and (17) are
written respectively in the form:
(−ATj + δdis − δint ·E
T
j (x)) · gij = w˜ij − δint · f
H
i ·
∑
k∈B
q−kij · xik, (19)
and,
(Aj + δint ·Ej(x)) · xij = 0, (20)
where the matrices Aj, with the transpose matrix A
T
j , and Ej(x), with the transpose
matrix ETj (x), are given respectively by:
Aj =


−q+1j q
−
2j 0 . . .
q+1j −q
+
2j − q
−
2j q
−
3j . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−2,j −q
+
n−1,j − q
−
n−1,j q
−
nj
. . . 0 q+n−1,j −q
−
nj


, (21)
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and,
Ej =


−
∑
k
q+k1j x1k
∑
k
q−k2j x2k 0 . . .
∑
k
q+k1j x1k −
∑
k
(q+k2j + q
−k
2j )x2k
∑
k
q−k3j x3k . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
∑
k
q+kn−2,jxn−2,k −
∑
k
(q+kn−1,j + q
−k
n−1,j)xn−1,k
∑
k
q−knj xnk
. . . 0
∑
k
q+kn−1,jxn−1,k −
∑
k
q−knj xnk


. (22)
We shall look further for the asymptotic regime with small rates δint · q
±k
ij . Therefore,
starting with (20) we are looking for stationary solutions of the form:
xij = x
0
ij + δint · x
1
ij +O(δ
2
int). (23)
Substituting (23) into (20), and equating terms of the same order in δ0int, δ
1
int, we
obtain respectively the following equations:
Aj · x
0
ij = 0, (24)
Aj · x
1
ij +E
0
j · x
0
ij = 0, (25)
where the notation E0j corresponds to the matrix Ej containing only elements of order
O(δ0int) (we use respectively the notation E
0T
j for the transpose matrix).
Assumption 1. Let the detailed balance condition (8) hold with all q+ij (or q
−
ij) being
strictly positive. We shall use the shorter notation, for i ∈ H : i 6= n, j ∈ B:
qij = q
+
ij = q
−
i+1,j. (26)
In the linear approximation of vanishing δint, we end up with an uncoupled system.
Since different elements of B are also uncoupled, then (24),(25) can be solved separately
for any j ∈ B. Looking at the zero order of small evolution transition rates, by (24), we
have the following result:
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Proposition 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the rank of Aj is exactly n− 1, while the
kernel of Aj is generated by the following vector:
x02j =
q+1j
q−2j
· x01j , x
0
3j =
q+2j
q−3j
·
q+1j
q−2j
· x01j , . . . , x
0
nj =
n−1∏
l=1
q+lj
q−l+1,j
· x01j
x01j =

1+ q
+
1j
q−2j
+
q+2j
q−3j
·
q+1j
q−2j
+ · · ·+
n−1∏
l=1
q+lj
q−l+1,j


−1
· x0j ,
(27)
where we have introduced the notation x0j =
∑
i x
0
ij . Specifically, under the detailed balance
condition Aj is symmetric, and its kernel generated by (27) is proportional to the uniform
distribution, x0ij = x
0
j/n for all i ∈ H, j ∈ B, that is, Ker(Aj) is generated by (1, . . . , 1).
Proof. Notice that system (24) is degenerate, as expected, since we are looking for non-
negative solutions satisfying
∑
j(x
0
1j + · · ·+x
0
nj) = 1. Thus, one of the n equations of (24)
can be discarded, say for example the last one. Rewriting the system of the remaining
(n− 1) equations by using the first equation, and then adding sequentially to each of the
next (n− 2) equations their previous one, one eventually obtains the following system:
q+1j · x
0
1j − q
−
2j · x
0
2j = 0
q+2j · x
0
2j − q
−
3j · x
0
3j = 0
...
q+n−1,j · x
0
n−1,j − q
−
nj · x
0
nj = 0.
(28)
This has an obvious solution, that is unique up to a multiplier, and is given by (27).
Alternatively, starting the exclusion from the last equation of (28), the solution to (24) is:
x0n−1,j =
q−nj
q+n−1,j
· x0nj, x
0
n−2,j =
q−n−1,j
q+n−2,j
·
q−nj
q+n−1,j
· x0nj, . . . , x
0
1j =
n−1∏
l=1
q−l+1,j
q+l,j
· x0nj
x0nj =

1+ q
−
nj
q+n−1,j
+
q−n−1,j
q+n−2,j
·
q−nj
q+n−1,j
+ · · ·+
n−1∏
l=1
q−l+1,j
q+l,j


−1
· x0j .
(29)
Given now the detailed balance condition (8), and the non-degeneracy established by
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Assumption 1, one observes from (27), or (29), that for every strategy j ∈ B we have:
x01j = x
0
2j = · · · = x
0
nj = x
0
j/n.
We have shown that in the main order of small evolution rates δint · q
±κ
ij , x
0∗
ij = x
0∗
j /n
is a fixed point of the evolution (6), along with the common control ucom = (uij→iκ = 0),
∀i ∈ H, ∀j,κ ∈ B, that is consistent with condition (18), and expresses the instantaneous
execution of personal decisions. This will also be a stable solution of the stationary system,
if x0∗ij = x
0∗
j /n is a stable fixed point of (6), for u
com = (uij→iκ = 0), ∀i ∈ H, j,κ ∈ B.
Assumption 2. For technical (computational) purposes only, let the hierarchy and the
strategy set be of the same size, i.e. |H| = |B| ⇒ n = m.
To conduct the stability analysis, in the asymptotic regimes of large λ and small δint,
let us introduce the auxiliary variables:
yκ = x
0
ij − x
0∗
ij , (30)
where κ = i+ (j − 1) · n, such that κ ∈ K = {1, . . . ,n2 − 1}.
Using the above variables, we transform system (6) into the non-degenerate linear
homogeneous system:
y˙ = Λ · y, (31)
where Λ is the block matrix:
Λ =


A1 0 . . . . . . . . .
0 A2 0 . . . . . .
. . . 0 Aj 0 . . .
. . . . . . 0 An−1 0
∆ . . . . . . ∆ D


. (32)
Each matrix ∆ has the same non zero entries −q−nn on its bottom row, while the rest of
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its elements are equal to zero. Note, as well, that the Aj matrices are of dimension n×n,
and each zero matrix to the right of an Aj matrix is of dimension n×n · (n− j)− 1. The
(n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix D is given by:
D =


−q+1n q
−
2n 0 . . .
q+1n −q
+
2n− q
−
2n q
−
3n . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−3,n −q
+
n−2,n− q
−
n−2,n q
−
n−1,n
. . . 0 q+n−2,n− q
−
nn −q
+
n−1,n− q
−
n−1,n− q
−
nn


. (33)
Applying sequentially (starting with C1 ≡ A1, setting in the next step C1 ≡ A2 etc.)
the following block matrix formula:
det


C1 0
C2 C3

 = detC1 · detC3,
where C1, C2, and C3 are n×n, m×n, and m×m matrices respectively, the determinant
of Λ is given by:
detΛ = det(A1) · det(A2) · · · det(An−1) · detD. (34)
We further apply sequentially n−1 times the elementary row operation of row addition
on every n×n matrix Aj , starting with row n and adding in each step row i to row i− 1.
Eventually, we transform Aj into a lower triangular matrix of the form:


0 0 0 . . .
q+1j −q
−
2j 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−2,j −q
−
n−1,j 0
. . . 0 q+n−1,j −q
−
nj


, (35)
with a single zero eigenvalue, and n− 1 negative eigenvalues −q−ij , for i = 2, . . . ,n. Note
that since Aj are symmetric matrices (due to the detailed balance condition), the algebraic
multiplicity of each of their eigenvalues is equal to the geometric multiplicity.
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Regarding the (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix D, and bearing in mind the detailed balance
condition, we apply once the elementary row operation of adding row n− 1 to row n− 2,
and then, we apply sequentially n− 2 times the elementary column operation of adding
column i to column i+ 1, starting with column 1, to eventually transform D into the
following lower triangular form:


−q+1n 0 0 . . .
q+1n −q
+
2n 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−3,n −q
−
n,n 0
. . . 0 (q+n−2,n− q
−
n,n) −q
−
n−1,n


, (36)
with n− 1 negative eigenvalues −q+in, for i = 1, . . . ,n− 1. In total, we find that matrix Λ
has one zero eigenvalue of algebraic multiplicity n− 1, and n · (n− 1) negative eigenvalues.
Now it is trivial to transform Λ into a block diagonal matrix, subtracting sequentially from
each column i, ∀i = {1, . . . ,n · n− n}, each column j, ∀j = {n · n− n+ 2, . . . ,n · n− 1}.
For a block diagonal matrix, both the algebraic and the geometric multiplicity of an
eigenvalue is given by adding the multiplicities from each block. Then, for the block matrix
Λ the algebraic multiplicity of the zero eigenvalue is equal to its geometric multiplicity.
We, thus, have the following result:
Lemma 1. Let the Assumptions 1, 2 hold. Consider the linear system y˙ = Λ · y as defined
above. The solution to this system, that is the vector x0∗ij = x
0∗
j /n given by Proposition 3,
is stable (but not asymptotically stable) since Λ has n · (n− 1) negative eigenvalues, and
a single zero eigenvalue whose algebraic multiplicity equals to its geometric multiplicity.
The third asymptotic regime we shall look at is that of small discounting δdis. Obvi-
ously, no payoff discounting terms appear in the stationary kinetic equations (17). Moving
to the stationary HJB equation (16), or (19), initially we are looking for solutions of the
form:
gij = g
0
ij + δdis · g
1
ij. (37)
Substituting (37) into (19), and equating terms of zero order in δint and δdis, we get
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the equation:
−ATj · g
0
ij = w˜ij , (38)
In general, equation (38) has no (non-degenerate) solution, since (by Proposition 3)
the kernel of the symmetric matrix ATj = Aj is one dimensional, implying that the image
of the transpose matrix ATj is (n− 1) dimensional (by the rank-nullity theorem). More
precisely, equation (38) has no solution if:
(w˜ij ,x
0
ij) =
x0j
n
·
∑
i
w˜ij 6= 0. (39)
Thus, to remain in the non-degenerate regime, we need to introduce additionally the
following assumption;
Assumption 3. For every strategy j ∈ B the following is true;
∑
i
w˜ij 6= 0.
As a result, we are looking next for solutions of (19) in the form of the expansion:
gij = g
0
ij/δdis + g
1
ij + g
2
ij · δdis. (40)
Recall that we are looking at the asymptotic regime with small δint (weak binary in-
teraction), and small δdis (small discounting). One needs to distinguish clear assumptions
on the relation between the small parameters δint and δdis, for a full perturbation analysis.
In principle, three basic regimes can be naturally identified:
ID1: Interaction is relatively very small, i.e. δdis = δ and δint = δ
2.
ID2: Interaction and Discounting are small effects of comparable order, i.e. δdis =
δint = δ.
ID3: Discounting is relatively very small, i.e. δint = δ and δdis = δ
2.
We initially concentrate on the ID1 regime. Substituting (40) into (19), and equating
terms of order δ−1, δ0, δ1, we find respectively the following equations:
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ATj · g
0
ij = 0
−ATj · g
1
ij + g
0
ij = w˜ij
−ATj · g
2
ij + g
1
ij −E
0T
j · g
0
ij = 0.
(41)
The first equation in (41) tells us that g0ij belongs to the kernel of Aj (since Aj = A
T
j ),
that is, for arbitrary constants aj ∈ R, we get:
g0ij = aj · x
0
ij . (42)
The second equation in (41) tells us that w˜ij − g
0
ij belongs to the image of Aj , which
coincides with the orthogonal compliment to Ker(Aj), given the identity:
Im(Aj) = Ker
⊥(ATj ).
Besides, from Proposition 3 we find that the orthogonal compliment to Ker(Aj) is:
Ker⊥(Aj) = {x :
∑
i
xij = 0}. (43)
In this case, the fact that w˜ij − g
0
ij ∈ Im(Aj) further implies that:
∑
i
w˜ij =
∑
i
g0ij ⇒ · · · ⇒ g
0
ij =
∑
i
w˜ij/n. (44)
Looking at the third equation in (41), and noting that E0T g0ij = 0 for a uniform g
0
·j,
we conclude that g1ij ∈ Im(Aj) as well, that is, g
1
ij ∈ Ker
⊥(Aj). Thus, to identify g1ij we
need to invert Aj on the reduced (n− 1) dimension of Ker⊥(Aj).
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 hold, and let y ∈ Ker⊥(Aj). Then all solutions z to the
matrix equation Aj · z = y are given by the formula:
zij = z1j −
i−1∑
a=1
( a∑
β=1
yβj
qaj
)
, (45)
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∀i 6= 1, with arbitrary z1j . There exists a unique solution z·j ∈ Ker⊥(Aj) specified by:
z1j =
n−1∑
a=1
(
n− a
n
·
a∑
β=1
yβj
qaj
)
. (46)
Notice that formulae (45) and (46) yield zij = g1ij when yij = w˜ij − g
0
ij . In particular,
for g1ij we find the explicit expression:
g1ij =
n−1∑
a=1
((
1(i > a) ·
n− a− 1
n
+ 1(i ≤ a) ·
n− a
n
)
·
( a
qaj
·
∑
κ∈H
w˜κj
n
−
a∑
β=1
w˜βj
qaj
))
, (47)
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
Regarding the consistency condition (18), in the main order in small δ it can be written
in the equivalent form:
∑
i
w˜ik <
∑
i
w˜ij , (48)
for all i ∈ H, k, j ∈ B. Given that w˜·,· does not depend on δ, this leads to the interesting
result that in the equilibrium of the asymptotic regime of small δ, only those strategic
levels j ∈ B are occupied (that is, x0j 6= 0), where the sum
∑
i w˜ij obtains its maximum.
For simplicity, let us further consider the following assumption;
Assumption 4. There exists a unique behavioural level b ∈ B, such that:
∑
i
w˜ib >
∑
i
w˜ij . (49)
for all j ∈ B, such that j 6= b.
Note that Assumption 4 implies that in any equilibrium x∗, with δ sufficiently small,
all terms with j 6= b become irrelevant for the analysis.
We, thus, have the following result:
Proposition 4. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold. Consider the ID1 regime. Then,
the solution to the stationary problem described by (16), (17) and (18), in the main order
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in small δ, is given by:
x∗ib = x
0∗
ib = 1/n, x
0∗
iκ = 0 ∀κ 6= b ∈ B, i ∈ H, gib = δ
−1 · g0ib = δ
−1 ·
∑
i
w˜ib/n, (50)
where x0∗ij is a stable fixed point of (6).
Remark. If we continue in the next order of our perturbation analysis (subsequently in
the second next order, and so forth) we can obtain explicit approximate solutions with
arbitrary precision.
Next we consider the ID2 regime. In this case, we look at the solutions to (17) in the
next order with respect to small δ. In view of (50), we write (25) in the form:
Ab · x
1
ib + (q
+b
i−1,b − q
+b
ib + q
−b
i+1,b− q
−b
ib )/n
2 = 0, (51)
where
∑
i x
1
ib = 0, and the usual convention for the boundary terms, i = 1,n, apply.
Note that the right-hand side of Equation (51) belongs to Ker⊥(Aj), implying that:
∑
i
−(q+bi−1,b− q
+b
ib + q
−b
i+1,b− q
−b
ib )/n
2 = 0, (52)
Moreover, given that x1ib ∈ Ker
⊥(Aj), we can identify x1ib applying Lemma 2. Formu-
lae (45), (46) yield zib = x
1
ib when yib = −(q
+b
i−1,b− q
+b
ib + q
−b
i+1,b− q
−b
ib )/n
2.
Regarding the solution to (19) in ID2, substituting (40) into (19), and equating terms
of order δ−1, δ0, δ1, we get respectively the following equations:
ATj · g
0
ij = 0
−ATj · g
1
ij + g
0
ij −E
0T
j · g
0
ij = w˜ij
−ATj · g
2
ij + g
1
ij −E
0T
j · g
1
ij −E
1T
j · g
0
ij = −f
H
i ·
∑
k
q−kij · x
0
ik,
(53)
where the notation E1j corresponds to the matrix Ej containing only elements of order
O(δint) (we use respectively the notation E1Tj for the transpose matrix).
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The first two equations in (53) are identical with the corresponding equations in (41)
(recall that E0Tj g
0
ij = 0 for a uniform g
0
ij), and provide the same results expressed through
(42), (44). Looking at the third equation in (53), and noting that E1Tj g
0
ij = 0, we observe
that (g1ij − E
0T
j g
1
ij + f
H
i ·
∑
k q
−k
ij · x
0
ik) ∈ Ker
⊥(Aj), implying that g1ij can be uniquely
identified through formula (45) of Lemma 2, with zij = g1ij and yij = w˜ij − g
0
ij , under the
condition:
∑
i
(g1ij −E
0T
j · g
1
ij + f
H
i
∑
k
q−kij · x
0
ik) = 0. (54)
Last we consider the ID3 regime. Substituting (40) into (19), but equating now terms
of order δ−2, δ−1, δ0, we get the equations (in analogy to (41), (53)):
ATj · g
0
ij = 0
E0Tj · g
0
ij = 0
−ATj · g
1
ij + g
0
ij −E
1T
j · g
0
ij = w˜ij .
(55)
Again, the first and the third equations in (55) lead to the same results with the first
and the second equations in (41), namely to (42) and (44) respectively, while the second
equation in (55) always holds for a uniform g0ij .
We, thus, have the following result:
Proposition 5. The solution to the stationary consistency problem in the main order in
small δ in ID2 and ID3, is the same with the one identified in Proposition 4 for ID1.
4 Time-dependent Problem
The solution to a non-linear Markov game of mean-field type like the one we consider
here (on a finite time horizon), defines an epsilon-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding
game with a finite number of players, see, e.g., Basna, Hilbert and Kolokoltsov (2014).
Having identified the solution to the stationary MFG consistency problem, we need next
to look at the time-dependent consistency problem in order to validate our results for ini-
tial/terminal conditions other than those given by the solution of the stationary problem.
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We further need to investigate the stability of the fixed point x0∗ij (see Lemma 1) without
necessarily assuming that from the very beginning all players apply the same stationary
control ucom = (uij→iκ = 0).
For the full time-dependent problem, the HJB equation for the discounted optimal
payoff e−δdis·t · gij(t) of an individual at state (i, j) with any planning horizon T is given by
(13), where the occupation density vector x = (xij) is also time varying. For definiteness,
we shall focus on the ID1 regime (the same method applies for ID2, ID3 regimes). Our
aim is to show that by fixing the control uiα→iβ = 0 in (13), ∀i ∈ H,α,β ∈ B, the solution
to the resulting system:
g˙iα +wiα + q
+
iα · (gi+1,α − giα) + q
−
iα · (gi−1,α − giα − f
H
i )
+
∑
k∈B
δint · xik · (q
+k
iα · (gi+1,α − giα) + q
−k
iα · (gi−1,α − giα − f
H
i )) = δdis · giα(t),
(56)
will be consistent, that is, the control uiα→iβ = 0 will indeed give a maximum in (13)
in all times. Fixing the control uiα→iβ = 0, ∀i ∈ H,α,β ∈ B, is actually equivalent to
assuming that:
giβ(T )− f
B
αβ ≤ giα(T ). (57)
Our aim here is to show that starting with a terminal condition belonging to the cone
defined by (57), we shall stay inside the cone for all t ≤ T . Therefore, it is sufficient
to show that on the boundary of this cone the inverted tangent vector of (56) is never
directed outside the cone. The necessary condition that needs to be satisfied for this to
be true for any boundary point gjβ − f
B
αβ = gjα is the following:
g˙jα − g˙jβ ≤ 0, (58)
where,
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g˙jα − g˙jβ = δdis · (gjα − gjβ) + (wjβ −wjα) + q
+
jβ · (gj+1,β − gjβ)
−q+jα · (gj+1,α − gjα) + q
−
jβ · (gj−1,β − gjβ − f
H
j )− q
−
jα · (gj−1,α− gjα− f
H
j )
+
∑
k∈B
δint · xjk ·
(
q+kjβ · (gj+1,β − gjβ) + q
−k
jβ · (gj−1,β − gjβ − f
H
j )
−q+kjα · (gj+1,α− gjα)− q
−k
jα · (gj−1,α− gjα − f
H
j )
)
.
(59)
We substitute into (59) gij and xij, taken from (40) and (23) respectively. Assuming,
then, that fHj is independent of δ, and equating terms of similar order, in the main order
O(δ−1) in small δ, condition (58) is equivalent to (recall that we are in the ID1 regime):
q+jβ · (g
0
j+1,β − g
0
jβ) + q
−
jβ · (g
0
j−1,β − g
0
jβ) ≤ q
+
jα · (g
0
j+1,α− g
0
jα) + q
−
jα · (g
0
j−1,α− g
0
jα). (60)
Note that in the main order O(δ−1) in small δ (assuming that fBαβ is also independent
of δ) for the specified boundary point of the cone, we get:
g0jβ = g
0
jα, (61)
while for all the other i ∈ H, such that i 6= j, will be:
g0iβ ≤ g
0
iα. (62)
Combining (61) and (62) we obviously get:
g0jα − g
0
iα ≤ g
0
jβ − g
0
iβ, (63)
and rewriting (60) in the equivalent form:
q+jα · (g
0
jα − g
0
j+1,α) + q
−
jα · (g
0
jα − g
0
j−1,α) ≤ q
+
jβ · (g
0
jβ − g
0
j+1,β) + q
−
jβ · (g
0
jβ − g
0
j−1,β), (64)
we check that condition (64) is satisfied when qiα ≤ qiβ, ∀i ∈ H (the first term is smaller
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or equal than the third term, the second term is smaller or equal than the fourth term).
But also for the case when qiβ < qiα, ∀i ∈ H, rewriting (63) in the equivalent form:
g0iβ − g
0
jβ ≤ g
0
iα − g
0
jα, (65)
we check that (60) is satisfied (again the first term is smaller or equal than the third term,
the second term is smaller or equal than the fourth term).
Thus we obtain the following main result:
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold. Assume additionally, ∀α,β ∈ B, that:
qiα ≤ qiβ or qiβ < qiα, ∀i ∈ H. (66)
Then, for sufficiently small discounting δdis = δ, and relatively smaller binary interaction
coefficient δint = δ2, in the main order in small δ, for any T > t, and for any initial
occupation probability distribution x(t), and any terminal payoffs such that:
giβ(T )− f
B
αβ ≤ giα(T ),
there exists a unique solution to the time-dependent discounted MFG consistency problem
such that the control u is stationary, and is given by uiα→iβ = 0, ∀i ∈ H, ∀α,β ∈ B, x(s)
stays near the fixed point of Proposition 4 as s→ T , and gij(s) stays near the stationary
solution of Proposition 4 (almost for all time), for large T − t.
5 Discussion
In this paper we formulate the interaction of a large number of small players under
the pressure of a major player (principal), on n-dimensional arrays, having in mind the
paradigm of individuals defending against a bio-terrorist; alternatively, the similar con-
text of corrupted tax inspectors against a benevolent authority. The n-dimensional arrays
dual structure naturally describes on the one hand the distribution of individuals among
m levels of ‘behaviour’ (e.g. levels of defence) and on the other, their distribution accord-
ing to a phenotypic characteristic among n levels of ‘hierarchy’ (e.g. levels of infection).
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Transitions on the first network structure are mainly subject to the individuals’ control,
while transitions on the second are mainly subject to the principal’s pressure. Transitions
on both structures may as well be an outcome of the individuals’ binary interactions. Our
model is a performance of a finite state non-linear Markov game combining mean-field,
evolutionary, and pressure-resistance types of interaction. For our analysis, we consider
the discounted mean-field game consistency problem. According to the general frame-
work of mean-field games we analyse the forward-backward system of coupled equations,
the kinetic equations governing the evolution of the individuals’ distribution among the
n×m states (forward equation), and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation giving the
individuals’ optimal payoff (backward equation). We solve the stationary problem and we
provide a link of the stationary solution to the time-dependent problem. For simplicity,
we work in the asymptotic regimes of fast execution of personal decisions, weak binary
interactions, and small payoff discounting in time. Considering a stationary control that
is consistent with the assumption of fast execution of personal decisions, in the main
order of small payoff discounting in time (or in the main order of weak binary interac-
tions), we find that individuals will be uniformly distributed among the ‘behaviours’ of
the unique ‘hierarchy’ level where the sum of rewards is maximised, and we obtain the
optimal payoff as a function of these rewards. We show that there is a unique solution to
the time-dependent problem, that is very close to the stationary solution. Our simplifi-
cations, while necessary for concrete calculations, represent the first step towards a more
comprehensive treatment of the game that we have introduced and explicitly formulated.
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